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I.

INTRODUCTION
In June of 1995, the Mexican government requested the extradition
of former Deputy Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu, who was accused
of engaging in a cover-up in the investigation of the assassination of his
own brother, a top official in Mexico's ruling party. A federal magistrate
who reviewed the extradition request, sitting in Newark, New Jersey,
denied the government's request, ruling that witness statements taken in
Mexico were "incredible and unreliable" because they were taken in a
country which was infected with "massive corruption growing out of the
cocaine-smuggling trade," and that Mexico "has admittedly practiced
torture in the questioning of suspects." The magistrate also suggested that
statements were further tainted because the witnesses did not have counsel
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present when they were given.' This magistrate thus joined a number of
other federal judicial officials who conduct full judicial inquiry into the
protection of human rights in the criminal justice system of the receiving
state, here Mexico. His and other judicial decisions are part of a growing
international trend to abandon or radically narrow the rule of non-inquiry.
The rule of non-inquiry is part of extradition law in the United
States and other countries. It asserts that the sending country will not look
behind the receiving country's request for extradition to the quality or
severity of criminal justice in that country because such inquiry is an
invasion of the requesting country's sovereignty and a violation of
international principles of comity. The rule of non-inquiry tacitly assumes
that the quality of justice in the receiving country is addressed in the initial
decision to execute an extradition treaty with the country in question, as
well as in the content of the treaty itself. Thus, under the rule, neither the
criminal processes to which the defendant will be subjected, nor the
potential conditions of confinement or severity of punishment in the
receiving country are relevant factors for consideration by the reviewing
authority in the sending state. New critical scholarship has asserted that
the rule of non-inquiry, devised at the turn of the century in the United
States, should be abandoned. 2 I will not replicate those arguments in depth
1. Robert L. Jackson & Juanita Darling, U.S. Judge Won't Extradite Former Mexico
Official, L.A. TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at Al. The most adventurous of the court decisions in this
protracted litigation arose when the government changed tactics after repeated failure to obtain an
extradition order for Ruiz Massieu, and instead shifted to deportation proceedings. A federal
district court in New Jersey reviewed the authority of the Secretary of State to order deportation
and found the unreviewable nature of that authority to be, inter alia, an unconstitutional
delegation of judicial powers to the executive branch. The decision finds unconstitutional 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C)(I), which, according to the court, had not been construed previously.
Ruiz Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681 (N.J. 1996). The government successfully appealed the

grant of a permanent injunction against the deportation proceeding of Ruiz Massieu. Without
reaching the broader constitutional claims addressed by the lower court, the Court of Appeals

recently held that Ruiz Massieu must exhaust available administrative remedies before pursuing
federal court review. Ruiz Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 460, (3d Cir. 1996).
2.
See, e.g., John B. Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights
on Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 401 (1990); Lauren Sara Wolfe, Gill &
Sandhu v. Imundi: Due Process and Judicial Inquiry into Potential Mistreatment of Extraditees
by Requesting Countries, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1009 (1991); David B. Sullivan,
Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in InternationalExtradition, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP
L. REV. 111 (1991); Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in
Extradition Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85 (1992); John Quigley, Criminal Law
and Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ratification of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, 80-5 (1993); Valerie Epps, Note,
International Decision: Treaties-United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaties-Rule of

Expanded PoliticalOffense-Type Exception, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1996). But see Michael P.
Scharf, Note, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry
Provision of the Supplementary United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J.
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here. The critics, however, struggle to articulate a standard by which such
review should take place, or a remedy when the reviewing authority
anticipates serious violations of human rights in the receiving country.
I propose here that judicial inquiry should be permitted so long as
both the sending and receiving states are parties to international human
rights instruments which define each country's common acceptance of
binding principles of international human rights in the criminal process.
Whenever the reviewing authority finds it more likely than not that a
human right commonly subscribed to by the two countries would be
violated, the extradition request should be denied unless assurances can be
obtained that the receiving government will not violate the rights in
question and a means of review for compliance with those assurances is
provided. Failure to adhere to these principles itself amounts to a violation
of human rights, in that most such instruments provide for "effective
remedies" 3 in the domestic courts for their enforcement. In short, shared
human rights commitments must take precedence over mere notions of
comity or political considerations.'

II.

THE Now-OBSOLETE ORIGINS OF THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY
In the United States, the rule of non-inquiry was developed
judicially in 1901 in the United States Supreme Court's decision of Neely
v. Henkel. The Court rejected a contention by the extraditee that, if
surrendered to Cuba, he would not be tried under procedures which
conformed to guarantees found in the United States Constitution. The
Court held that the safeguards of the United States legal system, and in
particular its criminal procedures, are inapplicable to crimes committed in
foreign jurisdictions. 6 Other rationales have developed, in the United
States and abroad, to justify the use of the rule of non-inquiry. In general,
these include assertions that court review of decisions on the operation of
overseas legal systems would involve the courts in foreign affairs. This
INT'L. L. 257 (1988); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of

Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198 (1991)
(arguing for strict adherence to the rule of non-inquiry).
3. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2.3(a). See
generally discussion in JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:

CASES AND

MATERIALS 386-391 (1996).
4. An argument might also be made that in the case of reluctance by the receiving country
to accept basic human rights norms through treaty ratification, the sending country should apply
customary international human rights norms to the receiving country to ascertain its legal
obligations.
5.

Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).

6.

Id.at 123.
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argument is expressed through the political question doctrine or its
international analog, the act of state doctrine, under which the courts may
decline consideration of issues that are more appropriately undertaken by
the political branches of government. Another argument is that courts lack
the investigative machinery to verify claims of alleged abuses of human
rights in foreign legal systems. Still another is that review of the legal
systems of states with differing ideologies allows notorious criminals to
escape punishment. 7 -None of these reasons, including those originally
offered in Neely, can withstand scrutiny in the face of the developing law
of international human rights.
The premises underlying the Neely decision have been undermined
with the passage of time. There, the person being extradited argued that
the Cuban legal system failed to conform with the requirements of the
United States Constitution. No argument was offered that the country's
legal system could not measure. up against a universally accepted
international human rights standard because no such standards existed at
that time; they did not formally come into being as a body of law until
after World War II. Understandably, the Court was reluctant to extend
United States constitutional guarantees to another country. Moreover, the
person to be extradited had no real case or controversy alleging an actual
violation of his rights by the Cuban legal system; nor did he offer proof
that the Cuban legal system was likely to treat him badly in fact. He
offered only general allegations that Cuba did not provide habeas corpus
or jury trial protection, nor did it prohibit ex post facto laws. He did not
offer proof as to how he had been or might be affected by such failures in
Cuban law. 8 Today, such proof is easily available through extensive
human rights reporting by both domestic and international monitors or
through expert testimony. In the context of political asylum claims, for
example, the Cuban legal system routinely comes under close scrutiny and
has been held to violate human rights norms inherent in the law of political
asylum.9
Asylum judges make findings of fact and law about the quality of
justice, often basing their findings on submissions from the applicant for
asylum as to that issue as found in human rights reports from credible
governmental and non-governmental offices. In fact, the extensive and
detailed annual reports on human rights country conditions prepared by the
7.

These arguments are collected and analyzed in Shea, supra note 2, at 93.

8.
9.

Neely, 180 U.S. at 122.
See, e.g., Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,

Int. Dec. 3222, (BIA 1990), (granting

withholding of deportation to a gay Cuban because he could not expect to find adequate

protection in the Cuban legal system if he were returned there).
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United States Department of State are now generally considered a model of
accuracy and fairness, and have been a great help to judges in their
assessment of the risks of return of putative asylees. 0
There is also little evidence that the executive branch is any more
capable of exercising the fact-finding function than the judicial branch,
and some evidence to demonstrate the contrary. For example, in the
United States, the executive branch has negotiated extradition treaties with
many countries whose governments have since changed to repressive
regimes. While the State Department reserves the right to terminate an
extradition treaty where fundamental fairness cannot be preserved, the
United States has never done so in its history." Finally, the executive
branch, acting through the Justice Department in extradition proceedings,
may have ethical conflicts in distancing itself from the interests of foreign
governments. In an affidavit describing the role of the executive branch in
the extradition process, submitted by the State Department in an
extradition proceeding in New York, the Department asserted that "the
Department of Justice, through the office of the United States Attorney,
will represent the legal interests of the requesting State at the hearing...
,12 It is hard to imagine how the government of the United States can
represent the interests of the receiving state in extradition, and then
neutrally assess the potential human rights consequences of extradition
prior to the extraditee's surrender in the same proceeding.
III.

EROSION OF THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY IN INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC COURTS
Courts in the United States have shown increasing interest in
abandonment of the rule of non-inquiry. A series of decisions in the
United States uses the standard set out in the decision of Gallina v. Fraser.
Where the Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals observed that
judicial inquiry is appropriate when "the relator, upon extradition, would
be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's
sense of decency as to require reexamination" of the rule of non-inquiry. 3
10.

This has not always been true.

In the years of the Reagan and Bush administrations,

during which the State Department's country reports became extremely politicized, human rights
organizations published an annual critique of the reports, arguing their factual inaccuracy and
errors, and adding information relevant to human rights concerns. The need for such correction,
in itself, argues for removal of the fact-finding function of the judicial branch.
11.

WOLFE, supra note 2, at 1029.

12. State Department affidavit in Gill and Sandhu v. Imundi, quoted in Paust, supra note 3,

at 387.
13.

Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).

The Gallina court's reasoning has been questioned more recently in the appeal from a well-
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Despite this narrow and strict standard for abandonment of the rule, courts
in the United States have begun to question the application of the rule of
non-inquiry. Similar trends are discernible in Canada and the United
Kingdom.' 4
An interesting and very recent case, for example, is the January
1996 decision of a New Jersey federal district court judge in Sidali v.
INS.'" There, the court refused extradition and granted habeas corpus
relief, finding that the government had not established probable cause to
believe that the petitioner had committed a crime in Turkey, although the
highest reviewing court of that country had upheld his conviction for rape
and murder. The judge provides an excellent analysis of arcane criminal
procedure in Turkey, noting that the petitioner was acquitted by two
separate trial courts before his conviction was upheld on appeal when the
prosecution petitioned a reviewing tribunal to reexamine both the factual
and legal sufficiency of the lower courts' decisions to acquit.
The strictness with which the Gallina standard for waiver of the
rule of non-inquiry is applied, however, has created great difficulty for
those who seek to inquire into potential human rights violations by the
receiving country. Typical is the protracted litigation arising from a
request by the Indian government to extradite two gentlemen named
Sandhu and Gill, begun in the late 1980's and still in progress today. In an
attempt to challenge their extradition, the two men offered extensive
evidence that the Indian government systematically engaged in terrorism
against Sikhs. They were twice rejected by a federal magistrate who held
that such evidence was outside judicial purview, as such review is reserved
for the State Department.' 6 The federal district court, on review of the
application for extradition by writ of habeas corpus, granted the writ, in
large measure because of a finding that a confession of a third party
implicating Gill and Sandhu in the crimes for their extradition was tainted.
Indian courts themselves had found the confession to be involuntary and
reasoned decision granting extradition to Israel, but, relying on the reasoning of the Soering

decision, infra, n. 16, observing that a court which extradites to a state that violates human rights
makes the court a party to the violation. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y.
1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
An excellent compilation of decisions which erode the rule of non-inquiry can be found in
John B. Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on Extradition Law,
15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401 (1990). See also SULLIVAN, supra note 2.

14. Cases from Canada and the United-Kingdom are collected in Shea, supra note 2, at
113-119.
15.

Sidali v. INS, 914 F. Supp. 1104 (N.J. 1996).

the time of this writing.
16.

WOLFE, supra note 2, at 1016.

No appeal was reported in the case at
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untrue; the Indian decisions had not been revealed to the United States
courts in a timely fashion. The judge specifically declined, however, the
broader invitation to review the anticipated mistreatment of the men on
their own return to India.17 The grant of habeas corpus relief included an
option for the government to file new extradition complaints. When the
government availed itself of this option, another United States Magistrate
Judge, in the most recent of this long line of decisions, again declined to
permit the introduction of evidence that the men would be subjected to
torture and extrajudicial execution if extradited, agreeing reluctantly that
he must follow the law of the circuit on application of the rule of noninquiry. 8
Aside from judicial reluctance to intervene in this area, perhaps the
most difficult issue to resolve is that of an appropriate remedy. It is often
asserted that a decision not to grant a petition for extradition because close
judicial inquiry will make the sending country a "haven for international
criminals" given that the only effective remedy in such situations is the
release of the defendant from custody.1 9 While this is often offered as a
theoretical problem, it rarely occurs in actuality. Perhaps the best example
is the case involving Jens Soering, a German national who sought review
of Britain's decision to extradite him to the United States in the European
human rights system.2" Soering's extradition was sought in connection
with charges of capital murder in Virginia. When he prevailed at the
European Court of Human Rights, prosecutors in Virginia eventually
relented on their pursuit of the death penalty and assured British authorities
that capital punishment would not be sought. Soering was extradited,
convicted of murder, and sentenced to life without parole. 2, The
17. See discussion in Matter of Sandhu and Gill, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11828, at 3-4
(S.D.N.Y, Aug. 19, 1996).
18.

Id. at 13.

19.

See, e.g., WOLFE, supra note 2, at 1037.

20. Soering prevailed in the European Court on the claim that conditions on death row in
Virginia were so egregious that his return to face the "death row phenomenon" would constitute
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under international human rights law. Soering v. United
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A)(1989), reprinted in 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). The
United States was so concerned about its potential liability for violations of Soering that it
included an express reservation to Article 7 of both the Torture Convention and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, limiting the meaning of "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" in the latter to the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment under the
Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
David P.
Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: The Significance of the
Reservations, Understandingsand Declarations, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77 (1993).
21. Steinhardt, Recent Developments in the Soering Litigation, 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 453,
454 (1990). For a full discussion, see Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991);
Quigley & Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to
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requirement that assurances be given before the sending state surrenders
the individual to be extradited goes a long way toward addressing the
"haven for international criminals" argument. Moreover, the Soering
decision contains two implicit premises which should operate in all
extradition cases:
first, the sending state is responsible for the
consequences of its actions in surrendering a person to potential abuse of
human rights; and second, human rights principles must prevail over the
law of extradition.
A more difficult problem, in my view, is that of the consequences
of the receiving government's failure to fulfill its assurances. A recent
example from my own practice is relevant here. In 1994, the International
Human Rights Law Clinic at American University was contacted by
United States lawyers representing Joseph Kindler, an American who
escaped to Canada following his conviction for murder and death sentence
in Pennsylvania in 1983. These lawyers represented Kindler after his
return from Canada by extradition.
Kindler was extradited from Canada in a case which drew
international attention.
The Canadian Supreme Court ordered his
extradition and that of another prisoner, Charles Ng, in opinions which
sharply divided on the question of whether extradition to face the death
penalty in the United States would violate the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.2 2 The Human Rights Committee of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also reviewed the decision under its
powers to hear individual complaints against states parties. In a divided
decision, the Committee found that Kindler's extradition from Canada to
face the death penalty would not violate Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in that Kindler's facts were
distinguishable from Soering's. Counsel for Kindler had not alleged poor
conditions or the effects of delay in the Pennsylvania death penalty regime,
and there had been no simultaneous request for extradition to a non-death
penalty jurisdiction, as had been the case with Germany in the Soering
litigation.'
The United States had apparently assured the Canadians that
review of Kindler's murder conviction would comply in all respects with
Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1989).
the Court. Colin Warbrick,

The decision has been criticized as an overreaching by

Coherence and the European Court of Human Rights: The

Adjudicative Background of the Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1073, 1078-1080, 1090-1095
(1990).
22. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 84 D.L.R.4th 438, 67 C.C.C.3d 1 (1991).
See discussion in Shea, supra note 2, at 114-119.
23. Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, Decision of 30 July 1993, reported
in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993).
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due process. z4 After his extradition, Kindler's United States defense
counsel asserted to me that his appeals in the United States legal system
were being given short shrift by the courts, generally on grounds of
procedural bar, waiver, and collateral estoppel. His lawyers inquired
whether there was any recourse for this failure to provide fundamental due
process, which they felt had been part of the basis for the Canadian
executive branch and the courts' willingness to return Kindler to the
United States. The Canadian government had purportedly expressed some
interest in intervention in the appellate process but had no means, other
than by diplomatic note, to intervene in the jurisdiction of the United States
courts. On consultation with colleagues, our conclusion was that there is
no legal basis, and no legal precedent, for intervention in the proceedings
based on "breach of promise" by the receiving state. Our conclusion was
that Kindler had only diplomatic, not judicial, recourse. This lack of
ability to monitor the assurances, or to take action in the event of noncompliance by the receiving state, also needs a judicial solution.
The International Human Rights Law Clinic handled a case
involving the application of the rule of non-inquiry. Calum Ian Innes v.
United States was an appeal from denial of a petition for habeas corpus
seeking a bar on extradition of Mr. Innes from the United States to France,
where he had been convicted in absentia in 1982 of various offenses
having to do with importation of illegal drugs, smuggling, and fraudulent
profits.,, French authorities commenced the extradition process by filing a
complaint in the Western District of Louisiana, where Mr. Innes was
serving time on a federal conviction, in December 1992. A federal
magistrate certified Mr. Innes as extraditable after an extensive hearing on
the issue, and Mr. Innes filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The
writ was denied in June 1993, and Mr. Innes filed a pro se notice of appeal
when the district court denied his request for appointment of appellate
counsel. The Clinic was approached to undertake his appeal on a pro bono
basis on August 23, 1993. The same day, unknown to us, the Secretary of
State signed a warrant for the transfer of Mr. Innes to France. On August
27, 1993, Mr. Innes was surrendered to authorities in France. Not
knowing the exact whereabouts of our client, the Clinic entered an
appearance on August 31 and sought an emergency stay of removal, or in
the alternative, for Mr. Innes' return to the United States. The motion was

24. The assertion by Kindler's lawyers to this effect were part of their conversations with
me, and are not apparent from a review of the Canadian litigation surrounding his surrender.
25. Calum Ian Innes v. United States, No. 93-5112 (5th Cir. Ct. App.).
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denied as moot, but the appeal was not dismissed. Briefing of the case
went ahead as scheduled.
The Innes appeal raised two principal questions: first, whether the
executive branch violated court rules and separation of powers by
intentionally removing Innes from the jurisdiction, knowing of his pending
appeal; and second, whether the French government's guarantee of "trials
de novo" as a curative for the 1982 in absentia trials could meet minimal
standards of international human rights norms accepted as binding by both
the United States and France by virtue of their common ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Among
other fair trial guarantees, the ICCPR requires in article 14(3)(d) that the
defendant be tried in his presence. The second issue is the concern of this
paper.26 Our brief asserted that the mutual ratification by France and the
United States of the ICCPR establishes a minimum floor for due process
and fair trial considerations in both countries. Under these criteria, there
is little doubt that the French procedures for trial de novo after trial in
absentia violate the norms of the ICCPR and other international human
rights instruments. Such has been the position of both the Human Rights
Committee27 and the European Court of Human Rights28 when reviewing
cases involving denial of the right to trial in one's presence.
Unfortunately, the court never reached the issue. Following full
briefing and oral argument of the case, a short memorandum decision
dismissed the appeal as moot in August 1994.

26. The first issue also raises fascinating issues of international law beyond the scope of
this article.

The practice of removal of the extraditee during the pendency of his appeal is

apparently on the rise. We were aware of a number of such cases in addition to our own. In no
case, to our knowledge, did the court intervene to return the extraditee; all courts which have
reached the issue have dismissed the appeal as moot. While a stay order barring removal may
protect the appellant, many are unrepresented by counsel and unaware of the risk of not seeking a
stay. We did make the argument that another United States Court of Appeal had used the All
Writs Act to order the return of John Demjanjuk, alleged to be Ivan the Terrible, a notorious
guard at Treblinka, from Israel when he had been deported improperly from the United States.

That case is an unreported bench ruling, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20596 (1993).
27.

See, e.g., Mbenge v. Zaire, cited in DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS

COMMITrEE:

ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL

AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 425 (1994), and general discussion, id. at 425-429.

28. Cases in the European human rights system seem to uniformly read the right to
presence at one's trial (or appeals) in the strictest sense. In Poitrimol v. France, 18 E.H.R.R.
130 (1994), for example, the Court found a right to "presence" on appeal, through counsel, even
where the defendant himself intentionally absconded. A helpful discussion of this issue is found
in P. VAN DUK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION

ON HUMAN RIGHTS 319-322 (2d ed. 1990).
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IV. THE STRENGTHENING OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS AND THE BROADENING OF EXTRADITION TREATIES TO
CONFORM TO THOSE OBLIGATIONS

A total of 135 nations now have ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, including the United States.29 It is hard to
imagine a treaty that can be characterized more accurately as universal in
its application. The treaty carefully delineates rights to fair trial and
appropriate punishment in a fashion that could permit judicial
interpretation in the context of an extradition request. Moreover, article 2
of the Covenant requires, as noted above, that effective remedies for
vindication of the treaty rights be adopted by the parties to the treaty. This
requirement alone militates toward abrogation of the rule of non-inquiry
and recognition of the Gallina exception articulated above. However, the
United States has taken on a number of other treaty obligations that speak
directly to the extradition process.
Most specifically, the Torture Convention, to which the United
States has been a party since 1994, explicitly prohibits extradition from a
State Party "to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that [the extraditee] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture. "30 Application of this provision in the Sandhu and Gill litigation,
discussed above, seems appropriate, in that both the United States and
India have ratified the treaty, but it is never mentioned by the courts in any
of their deliberations. A similar provision is contained in Article 9 of the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which requires
that extradition:
shall not be granted if the requested State Party has
substantial grounds for believing: (a) That the request...
has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing
a person on account of his race, religion, nationality,
ethnic origin or political opinion; or (b) That the person's
position may be prejudiced (i) for any of the reasons
mentioned in subparagraph (a) .

. . ,

or (ii) for the reason

that communication with him by the appropriate authorities
of the State entitled to exercise rights of protection cannot
be effected.
29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1968, 6 I.L.M. 368. Information
on the current number of ratifying countries is taken from the United Nations Treaty Database on
the World Wide Web.
30. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 at art. 3.1.
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This treaty was also ratified by the United States in 1984. 31
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
accompanying Protocol, to which the United States is also a party, use the
language of persecution or threats to life andfreedom on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion as grounds for non-return or expulsion of refugees. 32 Finally, the
Third Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations, in its commentary,
notes that:
[e]xtradition is generally refused if the requested state has
reason to believe that extradition is requested for purposes
of persecution, or because the person sought belongs to a
particular political movement or organization, or if there is
substantial ground for believing that the person will not
receive a fair trial in the requesting state.33
A substitute for the Gallina exception to the rule of non-inquiry
might be gleaned from the foregoing treaty provisions, as well as the
language of the Supplemental Extradition Treaty between the United States
and the United Kingdom (Supplemental Treaty). 3 In article 3(a), the
Supplementary Treaty prohibits extradition "if the person sought
establishes . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . he would, if
surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in
his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political
opinions." This language, taken in part from the international standard for
the establishment of a claim of political asylum, abrogates the rule of noninquiry. It then couples the evidence to be permitted with a reasonable
standard of proof - preponderance of the evidence - for establishment of
the claim. Moreover, unlike the traditional, unappealable extradition
inquiry before a federal magistrate, the Supplementary Treaty stipulates, in
article 3(b), that decisions by the magistrate are immediately appealable by
"

31.

Covenant Against the Taking of Hostages, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456.

32. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force,
April 22, 1954), at arts. 1(A)(2) and 33(1); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 6 I.L.M.

78 (1967). The United States has ratified the Protocol, which incorporates the Convention by
reference, and incorporated the refugee definition into domestic legislation as part of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§1101(42), 1253(h).
33.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, at 476, Cm. h., g., at

711.

34. Reprinted in Senate Committee

on Foreign Relations Report,

Supplementary

Extradition Treaty With the United Kingdom, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. E,

15-17 (1986).
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either party to the federal district court or court of appeal, as appropriate. 35
This congressionally established standard for abrogation of the rule of
non-inquiry makes the judiciary the appropriate locus for review of
compliance by the receiving state with basic norms of international human
rights.
The standard finds its roots not only in the language of human
rights treaties binding on the United States, but also in the European
Convention on Extradition, under which eighty-five percent of all
extraditions in the world take place each year. 36 Convention article 3(2)
provides that extradition shall not be granted:
if the requested Party has substantial grounds for believing
that a request for extradition for an ordinary criminal
offense has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinion, or that the person's
position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.37
One treatise on international judicial assistance notes that the United States
"strenuously resisted" such language but ultimately agreed to some version
of it in treaties with three countries: Ireland in 1984, Jamaica in 1983, and
the United Kingdom. 3' This pattern of action by the State Department,
coupled with congressional action on the subject, show a clear willingness
by the other branches to permit judicial review of the question of potential
inequities in the criminal justice system of the receiving country.
Unfortunately, the limited judicial interpretations of the
Supplemental Treaty to date indicate a continued reluctance by courts to
intervene in extradition proceedings. In United States v. Howard, the First
35.

Cases and commentary on this legislatively-established exception to the rule of non-

inquiry note that it was adopted as a concession to those in the United States Congress who
opposed a broader effort to sharply narrow crimes designated as political under the United
States-UK extradition treaty. The scholarly output on the advisability of this course of action
was heated. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 2 (arguing for strict application of the rule of noninquiry); Note, Just Say No! United States Options to Extradition to the North of Ireland's
Diplock Court System, 12 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 249 (1989) (arguing for broad

application of the treaty exception because of the serious breaches of the right to fair trial posed
by the Diplock courts).
36. Otto Lagodny, Human Rights in the Fieldof Extradition, 62 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 45,
47 (1991).
37.

MICHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO RISToW,

4 INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE,

CRIMINAL EXTRADITION 108-109, 211-212, A-47 (1990).

There are also similarities with the

United Nations Model Extradition Code, Article 3(b), reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

(1994).
38.

ABBELL & RISTOW, supra note 37, at 108, 211.
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Circuit United States Court of Appeals found that the petitioner, an
African-American citizen accused of a particularly brutal murder of a
white female in the United Kingdom, had not established sufficient proof
of systematic racial prejudice in England to carry his burden of proof of
prejudice directed toward him. 39 The Court of Appeals, however, notes
that the new treaty language "openly alters [the] traditional practice" of
non-inquiry. °
A more troubling decision is that of the Ninth Circuit United States
Court of Appeals in United States v. Smyth. There, the District Court
refused to extradite based on an analysis of the potential harm to which
James Smyth would be exposed on return to Northern Ireland." The
Court of Appeals found that Mr. Smyth, convicted of attempted murder of
a prison officer in Belfast, had not established by a preponderance of the
evidence that his potential punishment or restrictions in Maze Prison in
Northern Ireland would be due to his affiliation with the Irish Republican
Army and not merely to his escape from prison.42 The extensive evidence
offered by the petitioner, as well as the refusal of United Kingdom officials
to cooperate with the fact-finding efforts of the trial judge, militate against
extradition if the reviewing court were to have applied the extensive
jurisprudence of asylum law on the issue of well-founded fear of
persecution based on political opinion. 3 Note should be made here of the
fact that both the United States and the United Kingdom are parties to the
Torture Convention's specific prohibition on extradition where there is a
strong probability of torture, a standard which no court examined. While
there is a question as to whether the potential retaliation against Smyth
would amount to torture, this explicit prohibition in international human
rights law should not have been ignored.
39. United States v. Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (1st Cir. 1993). The decision seems correct
on the record before the court, in that the petitioner offered little specific evidence as to prejudice
directed toward him. The petitioner argued for a per se rule, once evidence of prejudice was
established. Id. at 1331. The reviewing court, justifiably in this author's view, rejected that
standard and the sufficiency of the proof to establish specific prejudice directed at the petitioner.
The case is discussed in Mary B. McDonald, Extradition Law-Supplementary Extradition Treaty
Between United States and United Kingdom-Interpreted as PartialAbrogation of the Rule of
Non-Inquiry, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 391 (1995).
40. Howard, 996 F.2d at 1330.
41. In Re Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
42. United States v. Smyth, 61 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 1995). Some of my concerns with the
reasoning of Smyth at the Court of Appeals were shared by Valerie Epps in her Note on the case,
Epps, supra note 2. She concludes that the court "reveals very little legal analysis and an almost
willful urge to reverse findings of fact." Epps, supra note 2, at 299.
43. See generally DEBORAH ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM INTHE UNITED STATES: A
GUIDE TO ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND CASE LAW 126-138 (1991).
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V. CONCLUSION
The rule of non-inquiry, like many rules of international law
generally, is based on now obsolete views of sovereignty and the
appropriate role for an independent and fully informed judiciary. For
almost twenty years courts in the United States have applied a standard for
the grant or denial of political asylum in this country which requires the
court to weigh and balance the information about the extent to which a
refugee might be exposed to potential dangers of persecution, torture,
denial of a fair trial, or many other human rights violations in their country
of origin. No one, the State Department included, has argued that the
courts lack sufficient expertise to make these judgments, or that such
matters are better left to the discretion of the Executive branch. In fact,
the traditional practice of heavy reliance by courts or asylum hearing
officers on the opinion of the State Department as to the viability of the
asylum claim, either specifically or more generally, has yielded to the
expertise of the courts, due to both the high volume of cases and the
relative lack of information provided by the State Department."4
Abandonment of the rule of non-inquiry is not a change in policy
nor a major leap in fact-finding for the courts, despite their apparent
reluctance to fulfill what is not only a need but an established international
obligation. The language of three now well-established extradition treaties
with the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Jamaica provides a framework for
abrogation of the rule of non-inquiry that was agreed to by the Executive
branch and adopted by Congress. Some European countries have gone
further. It is now statutorily provided in Switzerland and Austria that no
extradition can proceed if the requesting state's procedures are not in
compliance with human rights standards.45 There is no reason not to apply
the more modest framework proposed here more generally to all
extradition cases. To do so would bring the United States into closer
conformance with the practice of the European extradition regime, a
regime which is applied in the vast majority of the world's cases.
44. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPRESENTING ASYLUM
APPLICANTS: AN ATrORNEY'S GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 84 (1995), "An Asylum Officer.
• . is not required to wait for comments from the State Department before deciding whether to
grant asylum."

But see SARAH IGNATIUS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ASYLUM PROCESS OF THE

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 133 (1993), "[tlhe [State Department] opinion
letters continued to play a role in asylum adjudication, although less than the almost total reliance
on them under the previous INS examiners." Ignatius notes that, for her study, a response of "no
additional information" or no response at all constituted as many as eighty percent of all State
Department responses to INS asylum cases.
45. Christine VanDenwyngaert, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: How to
Plug the TerroristLoophole Without Departingfrom Fundamental Human Rights, 62 INT'L REV.
PENAL L. 291, 307-308 (1991).

